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Abstract
This paper analyses wage inequality and the welfare e¤ects of changes in capital and
labour income tax rates for di¤erent types of agents. To achieve this, we develop a model that
allows for capital-skill complementarity given non-uniform distributions of asset holdings and
labour skills. We nd that capital tax reductions lead to the highest aggregate welfare gains
but are skill-biased and thus increase inequality. However, our analysis also shows that the
inequality e¤ects of capital tax reductions are lower over the transition period compared
with the long-run.
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Introduction
The literature on tax reforms in dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) models largely focuses on
the aggregate welfare benets and the distributional consequences of permanent reductions in
capital tax rates. Studies within the representative agent framework suggest that tax reforms
which reduce capital taxation will produce welfare gains for the society, even if the tax burden is
concurrently shifted to labour (see e.g. Lucas, 1990, Cooley and Hansen, 1992 and, more recently,
Angelopoulos et al., 2012; for the UK).1 The aggregate welfare benets from tax reforms that
reduce capital taxation can also be obtained in models with heterogeneous agents. However, these
models make clear that such reforms can have large redistributive e¤ects that will disadvantage
di¤erent groups in the society (see e.g. Domeij and Heathcote, 2004, Greulich and Marcet, 2008;
and Garcia-Milà et al., 2010).2
This literature has considered di¤erent types of market incompleteness to demonstrate the
distributional e¤ects of tax reforms and, in particular, capital tax cuts. An important dimension
in which agents di¤er, that is central to the analysis of capital tax reforms, is inequality in the
distribution of assets or wealth.3 A common approach to modeling this type of heterogeneity is
to assume that some agents do not have access to the capital markets, or more generally, that
some agents depend more on labour relative to capital income (see e.g. Judd, 1985, Lansing,
1999, Krusell, 2002, and Garcia-Milà et al., 2010).
In such environments, agents whose capital income is signicant can expect to gain after a
capital tax cut. However, the total e¤ects of a capital tax cut are not as clear for those agents
who depend predominantly on labour income, usually termed as the workers. There are costs to
workers from a capital tax cut, if this is accompanied by an increase in labour taxes. Nevertheless,
there can also be benets that take the form of increased labour productivity delivered by the
increase in the capital stock. Therefore, to evaluate the distributional e¤ects of capital tax cuts,
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both the productive role of capital and its complementarity with labour need to be explicitly
examined.
This complementarity between capital and labour becomes particularly important when the
economic structure suggests a distribution in the skill supply of the labour force, in addition
to the asset distribution, and even more so when these distributions are positively related. For
instance, the PSID data (see e.g. Table 2 in Garcia-Milà et al., 2010) suggest that high wealth is
positively related to higher wages, while evidence from the UK, discussed further below, suggests
that skill acquisition, in the form of University education, is related to socioeconomic income
group.
When the production structure exhibits capital-skill complementarities as suggested by e.g.
Krusell et al. (2000); and Hornstein et al. (2005), capital-augmenting policies are expected to
be skill-biased and thus increase the wage premium and inequality in the long-run.4 However,
the dynamic e¤ects on wage inequality in an environment where the distribution of assets is not
uniform are more di¢ cult to predict.
The importance of the transition period has also been highlighted in the welfare evaluation
of tax reforms literature. This is because the benets associated with the capital tax cut, in
the form of higher labour productivity, tend to materialise for the worker many years after the
reform (see e.g. Greulich and Marcet, 2008; and Garcia-Milà et al., 2010). However, when the
production structure exhibits capital-skill complementarities, the timing of the e¤ects on capital
tax cuts on wage inequality will depend on the evolution of the complementarities of capital with
the di¤erent types of labour over time.
With the above background in mind, this paper aims to analyse wage inequality and the
welfare e¤ects of changes in income tax rates for di¤erent types of agents, in a model that
allows for capital-skill complementarity, given non-uniform distributions of asset holdings and
labour skills. While the literature has allowed for joint inequality in asset holdings and labour
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productivity in evaluating capital taxes (see e.g. Domeij and Heathcote, 2004, Conesa et al.,
2009, and Garcia-Milà et al., 2010), our main interest is on the importance of the capital-skill
complementarity under such joint distributions. This allows us to examine the post-reform
evolution of wage inequality that is driven by an endogenous skill premium, and evaluate its
contribution in determining the overall inequality e¤ects of a given tax reform.
We focus on capital tax cuts, but also consider the e¤ects of cutting labour taxes. To isolate
the e¤ects of changes in each tax rate on all agents, we consider changes in tax rates that
are not revenue-neutral. Instead, given its current policy relevance, we consider tax reforms
consistent with a lower steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, to focus on the interaction
of asset and skill heterogeneity with a production structure that allows for di¤erent capital-
labour complementarities, we also abstract from other sources of heterogeneity that have already
attracted a lot of interest in the literature (e.g. stochastic or unobservable ability).
We calibrate our model to the UK economy to assess the likely costs and benets of tax
reforms for the di¤erent agents. The UK is used to illustrate the quantitative analysis since the
data suggest signicant heterogeneities in both asset holdings and skills in the labour supply,
which are also generally positively correlated. According to the Family Resources Survey in
2008-2009, 28% of households do not have any savings, 53% have savings up to £ 20,000 and
19% have savings above £ 20,000.5 Moreover, the Labour Force Survey of the O¢ ce for National
Statistics6 , suggests that in 2003, 28% of the working population was employed in low-skill, semi-
routine and routine occupations, whereas the remaining share worked in supervisory, technical,
professional and managerial occupations. There is also support for associating skill with income
group. For example, data from the Department for Education and Skills on the participation
rates in higher education for di¤erent income groups show that the participation ratio was about
three times higher in the 1990s for the three highest, relative to the three lowest groups.7 Finally,
the tax structure in the UK stands in stark contrast with other European countries, by having
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a very high capital to labour income tax ratio.8
Our modeling permits us to capture key features of heterogeneity. Following the literature
on credit constraints and income inequality (see e.g. Galor and Zeira, 1993, Benabou, 1996;
and Aghion and Howitt, 2009), nancial intermediation costs allow our model to generate het-
erogeneity in savings, which is consistent with the UK data. In addition, we use a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) specication for the production function, following e.g. Krusell
et al. (2000), which assumes di¤erent degrees of complementarity with capital for skilled and
unskilled labour. This allows our calibrated model to produce a wage premium that is in line
with empirical studies.
Our analysis shows that while capital tax cuts lead to the highest aggregate welfare gains,
the capital-skill complementarity amplies inequality e¤ects. The additional distributional ef-
fects that work through the structure of production and, more specically, the complementarity
between labour and capital materialise since capital tax reductions are skill-biased and thus
increase the skill premium and wage inequality (see also e.g. He and Liu, 2008).
However, our analysis also shows that the inequality e¤ects of capital tax reductions are lower
over the transition period compared with the long-run. This is because the skill premium initially
falls and then converges to the higher post-reform levels. This result is driven by the fact that,
in general equilibrium, the complementarity between capital and labour inputs is higher in the
short- than in the long-run. In particular, following the capital tax cut, the relative skill supply
increases, as the agents that hold the capital stock nd it optimal to increase labour income in
order to increase investment in capital. The initial increase in relative skill supply decreases the
skill premium. However, as the capital stock rises and the relative skill supply falls over time,
the skill premium converges to a higher, post-reform level.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section I presents the model which is calibrated
and solved at the steady-state in Section II. Section III discusses the main results and Section
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IV concludes.
I Model
In this section we construct a closed-economy DGE model comprised of a representative capitalist
and representative skilled and unskilled workers who all consume output in the product market
and supply labour in the factor market in return for labour income. The rst two income groups,
subject to intermediation costs, allocate savings to physical capital and government bonds in
return for capital income whereas unskilled workers do not save. The representative rm is owned
by the capitalist who hires (skilled and unskilled) labour services and leases physical capital from
the factor market for which it pays the competitive wage and interest rate, respectively. Finally,
the government taxes economic activity, provides public spending and issues debt to balance its
budget.
I.1 Population composition
The population size, N , is exogenous and constant. Among N , N c < N are identical capitalists,
Ns < N are identical skilled workers, and the rest, Nu = N  N c  Ns, are identical unskilled
workers. These three groups of agents are assumed to exogenously di¤er in their participation in
asset markets and in the type of labour services they can o¤er. In other words, we do not allow
for social mobility.9 Capitalists are indexed by the subscript c = 1; 2; :::; N c, skilled workers
by s = 1; 2; :::; Ns and unskilled workers by u = 1; 2; :::; Nu. There are also Nf rms, f =
1; 2; :::; Nf . We assume that the number of rms equals the number of capitalists, N c = Nf ;
and that each capitalist owns one rm. It is useful, for what follows, to dene N c=N = nc,
Ns=N = ns, Nu=N = nu = 1  nc   ns and Nf=N = nf .
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I.2 Firms
Each rm produces a single output, Y ft , using physical capital, K
f
t , and two distinct types of
labour, unskilled, hfu;t, and skilled, h
f
t , where skilled labour is relatively more complementary
to capital than unskilled labour. The production function is given by a constant returns to
scale (CRS) technology assumed to take a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) specication
following e.g. Krusell et al. (2000) and He (2012):
Y ft = A



hfu;t

+ (1  )
h


Kft

+ (1  )

hft
i  1
(1)
where A > 0 is constant productivity; 0 < ;  < 1, are the parameters determining the factor
elasticities, i.e. 1= (1  ) is the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labour
and between skilled and unskilled labour, whereas 1=(1   ) is the elasticity of substitution
between capital and skilled labour; and 0 < ;  < 1 are the factor share parameters. The above
CES form allows us to capture the notion of capital-skill complementarity, which is considered
to be a main driver of the skill premium and wage inequality (see e.g. Krusell et al., 2000; and
Hornstein et al., 2005).
Each rm acts competitively, taking prices and policy variables as given, and maximises
prots:
ft  Y ft   rktKft   wthft   wu;thfu;t (2)
subject to the technology constraint, (1); where wt and wu;t are, respectively, the wage rates of
skilled and unskilled labour and rkt is the interest rate on capital.
10 The di¤erent roles in the
production function for skilled and unskilled labour imply that there will be a skill premium for
the former, in the sense that the ratio of wt to wu;t will be larger than unity. We will calibrate the
production function so that the implied factor input elasticities and the resulting wage premium
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are in line with empirical studies.
I.3 Budget constraints of capitalists
The representative capitalist owns one rm and receives its prots. He also receives income from
providing skilled labour services, hc;t, to the labour market and income from interest on his
accumulated stock of nancial assets, in the form of capital, Kc;t, and government bonds, Bc;t.
The interest rate on government bonds is given by rbt . All these sources of income are taxed.
In particular, nancial asset and prot income are taxed at the constant rate k, while labour
income is taxed at the constant rate h.
We assume that those agents holding assets need to pay intermediation or transaction premia
due to imperfections in capital markets. For instance, these premia can represent the costs of
gathering extra information relating to legal issues, asset-specic government regulations and
intermediation fees. We follow Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Benigno (2009), and assume a
quadratic cost function such that the capitalist incurs a cost of 'kcK
2
c;t for holding physical capital
and of 'bcB
2
c;t for holding government bonds, where '
b
c; '
k
c > 0measures the size of the transaction
costs. The presence of this capital market imperfection and of the associated transaction costs
help the model to capture a feature of realism. However, their main contribution here is that
they will allow us, as we shall see below, to capture household heterogeneity in asset holdings.
The capitalist uses his income for consumption, Cc;t, investment in capital, Ic;t, and in-
vestment in government bonds, Dc;t. He also receives average (per agent) transfers from the
government, Gt (= Gt=N). Thus, his budget constraint is:
Cc;t + Ic;t +Dc;t =
 
1  k  rktKc;t + rbtBc;t+
+
 
1  kft +  1  hwthc;t +Gt   'bcB2c;t   'kcK2c;t (3)
while the evolution equations of the stock of capital and government bonds, respectively, are
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given by:
Kc;t+1 = (1  )Kc;t + Ic;t (4)
Bc;t+1 = Bc;t +Dc;t (5)
where 0 <  < 1 is the depreciation rate and Kc;0; Bc;0 > 0 are given.
I.4 Budget constraints of skilled workers
The problem of the skilled worker is similar to the capitalists, except that he pays di¤erent
transaction costs, so that the capital market imperfections a¤ect him to a greater extent. We
assume that rm ownership gives an insider advantage in nancial transactions to the capitalist
(due, for instance, to past experience, socioeconomic background and networks) and thus the size
of the transactions cost is lower for the capitalist. The idea that capital market imperfections
can explain heterogeneity has been extensively examined in the income inequality literature (see
e.g. Galor and Zeira, 1993, Benabou, 1996, and Aghion and Howitt, 2009). Most of these models
assume, for simplicity, that the intermediation cost is either innite for some agents (and thus
these agents are e¤ectively excluded from the nancial market) or zero. In this paper, we examine
the case of non-zero, nite intermediation costs for both capitalists and skilled workers where
'bc < '
b
s and '
k
c < '
k
s .
Accordingly, the budget constraints and the evolution equations for capital and government
bonds for the sth skilled worker are:
Cs;t + Is;t +Ds;t =
 
1  k  rktKs;t + rbtBs;t+
+
 
1  hwths;t +Gt   'bsB2s;t   'ksK2s;t (6)
Is;t = Ks;t+1   (1  )Ks;t (7)
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Ds;t = Bs;t+1  Bs;t: (8)
I.5 Budget constraint of unskilled workers
Unskilled workers di¤er from capitalists and skilled workers in two important respects. First,
capital market imperfections result in them being excluded from the nancial markets as in the
models of Benabou (1996), and Aghion and Howitt (2009).11 Second, we assume that exclusion
from capital markets does not allow them to acquire the skills to provide skilled labour services,
so that their labour e¤ort di¤ers, in nature, from the labour e¤ort of the other two types of
agents. Evidence from the UK, introduced later, suggests that skill acquisition, in the form of
University education, is related to socioeconomic income group.
Thus, the budget constraint of the uth unskilled worker is:
Cu;t = (1  u)wu;thu;t +Gt (9)
where 0  u < 1 is the tax rate on unskilled labour, hu;t is the labour supply and Cu;t is
consumption.
I.6 Utility function and optimal choices of agents
Each type of household i = c; s; u maximises:
1P
t=0
tu (Ci;t; hi;t) (10)
where  is the subjective time preference, subject to the relevant budget constraints given above.
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We use the instantaneous utility function:
ui;t = (Ci;t; hj;t) =
h
(Ci;t)

(1  hi;t)1 
i1 
1   (11)
where 0 <  < 1 is the consumption weight in utility and  > 1 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion.
To maximise discounted utility, the representative capitalist chooses fCc;t; hc;t;Kc;t+1; Bc;t+1g1t=0
subject to (3  5), the representative skilled worker chooses fCs;t; hs;t;Ks;t+1; Bs;t+1g1t=0 subject
to (6  8) and the representative unskilled worker chooses fCu;t; hu;tg1t=0 subject to (9).
I.7 Government budget constraint
Following the literature on tax reforms (see e.g. Lucas, 1990, Cooley and Hansen, 1992, Gi-
annitsarou, 2006, Garcia-Milà et al., 2010, and Angelopoulos et al., 2012), we do not model
government spending. Instead, government expenditure takes the form of transfers to the pri-
vate agents, Gt. To nance these, it taxes income from labour and nancial assets and issues
government bonds, Bt. The budget constraint of the government is thus given by:
Gt +
 
1 + rbt

Bt = Bt+1 +N
c[k
 
rktKc;t + r
b
tBc;t

+ hwthc;t]+
+Ns[k
 
rktKs;t + r
b
tBs;t

+ hwths;t] +N
u[uwu;thu;t]. (12)
I.8 Market-clearing conditions
The market clearing conditions for the capital, bond, skilled and unskilled labour and product
markets respectively are:
NfKft = N
cKc;t +N
sKs;t (13)
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Bt = N
cBc;t +N
sBs;t (14)
Nfhft = N
chc;t +N
shs;t (15)
Nfhfu;t = N
uhu;t (16)
NfY ft = N
cCc;t +N
sCs;t +N
uCu;t +N
c [Kc;t+1   (1  )Kc;t] + (17)
+Ns [Ks;t+1   (1  )Ks;t] +N c
 
'bcB
2
c;t + '
k
cK
2
c;t

+
+Ns
 
'bsB
2
s;t + '
k
sK
2
s;t

where (17) gives the aggregate resource constraint of the economy.
I.9 Decentralised competitive equilibrium
The decentralised competitive equilibrium (DCE) is dened when (i) households and rms op-
timise, taking prices and policy as given; (ii) all constraints are satised; and (iii) all markets
clear. After the relevant substitutions, we summarise the DCE in the paths of the following
variables: (Cc;t; Cs;t; Cu;t; hc;t; hs;t; hu;t; wt; wu;t;Kc;t+1;Ks;t+1; Bc;t+1; Bs;t+1; rkt ; r
b
t ) given the
remaining scal policy instruments, i.e. taxes 0  k; h; u < 1 and government transfers,
Gt  G, which are all held constant to focus on permanent changes in tax rates. We dene the
relevant aggregate, economy-wide quantities as, Xt, for Xt = fCt; It;Kt; Bt; Ytg.
II Calibration and steady-state
In Table 1, we next calibrate the structural parameters of the model so that its steady-state solu-
tion, reported in Table 2 below, reects the main empirical characteristics of the UK economy.12
12
The calibration also provides empirical justication for the key modelling decisions made above.
II.1 Population shares
We rst wish to map out agent heterogeneity and thus distinguish the three types of households
by their di¤ering shares in the population, ni. According to the Family Resources Survey in
2008-2009, 28% of households do not have any savings, 53% have savings up to £ 20,000 and 19%
have savings above £ 20,000. In light of this, since we assume that unskilled workers do not have
savings, we set nu equal to 30%. At the other end of the distribution, since we model capitalists
as the income group with the highest share of savings and assets, we set nc to 20% implying that
ns is 50%.
Other data providing an additional dimension by which unskilled workers di¤er from skilled
workers and capitalists is that the former group o¤ers a labour input that is lacking in skills.
According to the Labour Force Survey of the O¢ ce for National Statistics, in 2003, 28% of
the working population was employed in semi-routine and routine occupations, whereas the re-
maining share worked in supervisory, technical, professional and managerial occupations, which
require an increasingly higher skilled labour input. Moreover, according to data from the Depart-
ment for Education and Skills on the participation rates in higher education for di¤erent income
groups, the participation ratio was about three times higher in the 1990s for the three highest,
relative to the three lowest groups. Thus, there seems to be adequate support for associating
skill with income group.
[Table 1 about here]
II.2 Productivity
We next turn to heterogeneity in productivity and returns to labour, which governs the choice
of the relevant production parameters. Using the estimates in Krusell et al. (2000), we set
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 =  0:495 and  = 0:401 implying elasticities of substitution between capital and skilled labour
and between capital (or skilled labour) and unskilled labour of about 0.67 and 1.67 respectively.13
Our calibration of  = 0:645,  = 0:275 and A = 1:65 allows us to obtain the labour share of
income, the skill premium and the capital to output ratio consistent with the UK data.
II.3 Savings
Heterogeneity in savings is controlled for, as explained in the previous section, by the parameters
that govern transaction costs in the nancial markets. Following the models in e.g. Galor and
Zeira (1993), Benabou (1996) and Aghion and Howitt (2009), we set these costs to innity for the
unskilled workers, which implies that these agents do not have any savings. As said above, about
28% of the UK households do not save. Regarding the households with positive savings, data
from the Family Resources Survey of 2008-2009 suggest that households in the highest saving
bracket have about ve times higher savings than the other savers, on average. In terms of our
model, this di¤erence is applied to the representative capitalist and skilled worker by setting the
ratio of transaction costs faced by each of these agents to be equal to 5. For simplicity, we set
this cost in capital asset markets to be the same in the bond market. It is worth noting that
we choose the level of the transaction costs parameter, so that in combination with an annual
depreciation rate, , of 6%, the total ratio of capital to GDP in the steady-state is about 2
and that the transaction costs are about 1% of asset holdings. The latter is broadly consistent
with the average di¤erence between the lending and borrowing rates in the UK (see, e.g. World
Development Indicators - WDI - database) over the past 30 years.
II.4 E¤ective tax rates
E¤ective average tax rates for capital and labour income are constructed by following the ap-
proach in Conesa et al. (2007). We use data from the National Accounts and the Public Sector,
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Taxation and Market Regulation databases (available from OECD Statistics), to obtain the data
for 1970-2005. The average capital tax rate over the time period is about k = 0:44, while the
average labour income rate is around 0:27. Using data from Social Trends 38, O¢ ce for National
Statistics, we are able to approximate the progressivity of the UK income tax system at about
1:6.14 A ratio of h=u = 1:6, together with the requirement that the weighted average of the
two tax rates equals the e¤ective labour income tax rate, would imply that h = 0:304 and
u = 0:19. However, the progressivity of income taxation probably overestimates the progres-
sivity of labour income taxation, which is our interest here. This is because, in light of the data
discussed, we would expect the higher income brackets to have more capital income compared to
the lower income brackets. On the other hand, the lower the progressivity ratio, the higher the
implied value of u. We thus use a progressivity ratio of h=u = 1:5 for the calibration, which
guarantees that u is equal to the base income tax rate. Accordingly, we approximate the lower
tax rate, u, at 20%, and the higher labour income tax rate, h, at 30%.
II.5 Parameters common to all agents
We next approximate the rate of time preference, , so that 1= is equal to 1 plus the ex-post
real interest rate, where we use real interest rate data from OECD Main Economic Indicators,
from 1970-2005. This gives a value of 0:976 for . Following Kydland (1995), we set , the
weight given to consumption relative to leisure in the utility function, equal to the average value
of work versus leisure time, which is obtained using the data on hours worked from the OECD
Economic Outlook database, from 1970-2005.15 We also use a common value from the literature
for the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, 1= = 0:5 or  = 2.
Given that we will evaluate policies that reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio below, we calibrate
the share of government spending in GDP, G=Y = 31%, to obtain a B=Y ratio of 70% based on
o¢ cial forecasts for 2011-2013 (see e.g. the Pre-Budget Forecast, June 2010, O¢ ce for Budget
15
Responsibility).16
II.6 Steady-state
The steady-state solution of the model is given in Table 2 below in terms of the aggregate
variables. The gures show that the capitalists consume in total 19:4% of total income (or about
23% of total consumption)17 , skilled workers consume in total 44% of total income (or around
52% of total consumption) and unskilled workers consume in total 22:3% of total income (or
approximately 26% of total consumption). In addition, the capitalists in total own about 67% of
the capital and government bonds in the economy. As said above, the ratio of savings, Ic=Is, and
assets, Kc=Ks and Bc=Bs, of the representative capitalist to the representative skilled worker, is
equal to ve. Note also that the net (after depreciation, tax and transaction costs) interest rates
on capital and bonds, are given respectively by:
erk = rk(1  k)     2'kc  ncnc + ns

Kc   2'ks

ns
nc + ns

Ks (18)
erb = rb(1  k)  2'bc ncnc + ns

Bc   2'bs

ns
nc + ns

Bs (19)
and are equal in the steady-state. Table 2 shows that these returns are 2.5%, which compares
favourably with the 1970-2005 average UK real interest rate, equal to 2.1% in the WDI database.
[Table 2 about here]
It is next worth noting that the ratio of average hours worked by unskilled workers to the
average hours worked by skilled labour in the model is 1:1, which is the same as in the UK Labour
Force Survey (LFS) data.18 These work-time allocations imply Frisch (or -constant) labour
supply elasticities of 3:97 for capitalists, 2:18 for skilled and 2:19 for unskilled workers, which are
16
similar to values calibrated in macro models (see e.g. Browning et al., 1999, Chetty et al., 2011;
and Keane and Rogerson, 2012; for a discussion regarding micro and macro elasticities). The
value for the capitalists suggests that, as expected, this group is the relatively least dependent on
labour income, and is consistent with the research in Low (2005) and Domeij and Floden (2006),
which suggests that agents without full access to asset markets prefer increased work hours. Table
2 also shows that the labours share of income in the model, w(N
chc+N
shs)+wuN
uhu
Y = 0:633 is
close to the value (i.e. 0:601) obtained from the OECDs International Sectoral Database (ISDB)
for 1970-2005.
Turning to the skill premium in the UK, Walker and Zhu (2008), estimate a college premium
(dened as the log di¤erence between the wage rate for skilled and unskilled labour) of about
18% for males and 28% for females, while Machin (1996), computes the ratio of wages between
non-manual and manual jobs in manufacturing that ranges between 1:3 and 1:5, from 1970 to
1990. For the US, Hornstein et al. (2005) report a college premium, in terms of wage ratios, that
ranges from about 1:47 in 1982 to 1:79 in 2000. The skill premium obtained predicted by our
calibration is w=wu = 1:37 or ln(w=wu) = 31%. Finally, note that in the steady-state Cc = 0:439;
Cs = 0:402 and Cu = 0:331. Thus in terms of welfare, U , higher consumption and lower work
e¤ort make the capitalists better o¤, followed by the skilled and unskilled workers, respectively.
The weighted average measure of aggregate or Benthamite utility, Ua, is also reported.19
III Tax reforms
In this section, we examine ve di¤erent tax reforms that meet a debt-to-GDP target of 60% in
the steady-state. The latter provides us with a common base for conducting the policy reforms.20
We start by changing the capital income tax rate, k, holding all other rates constant. Next
we examine changes in the labour income tax rates, rst on skilled labour, h, and second on
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unskilled labour, u; each implying that the progressivity of labour income taxation has been
altered. We then examine the case where the government changes the e¤ective average labour
tax rate, i.e. h and u move proportionately, so that the progressivity in the labour income
taxation remains una¤ected. Lastly, we evaluate the distributional e¤ects of varying all tax rates
proportionately.
For each tax reform considered, we rst nd the steady-state tax rate(s) required to obtain
the target debt-to-GDP ratio and then impose these new tax rates on the pre-reform economy to
obtain the dynamic paths post-reform. Following, for example, Giannitsarou (2006) and Ardagna
(2007), to obtain the dynamic solution of the model and simulate the transition paths after the
tax reform, we use a log-linear approximation to the DCE described above. We calculate post-
reform welfare, conditional on the initial, pre-reform steady-state, for each type of agent and
for the aggregate economy, using the discounted utility expression in (10). This is initialised
from the pre-reform steady-state and thus includes the transition period from the pre- to the
post-reform steady-state.21 In contrast, post-reform steady-state welfare excludes the transition
path.
III.1 La¤er curves in tax revenue and debt
Prior to undertaking the welfare analysis, it is rst useful to demonstrate the general equilibrium
e¤ects of tax changes on factor returns and quantities by examining the impact of tax changes on
the tax revenue from all tax bases. The relationship between the tax revenue from a particular
tax base and the associated tax rate is, in general, given by a La¤er curve (see e.g. Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe, 1997, and Trabandt and Uhlig, 2012). In our model, changing a tax rate can
lead to either increases or decreases in the tax revenue collected from this tax base, depending
on whether the economy is on the upward or downward slopping part of the curve, respectively.
In the CES production function with capital-skill complementarity that we employ, a tax rate
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change will have spillover e¤ects to the tax revenue collected from the other tax bases. For
instance, an increase in the capital tax rate will decrease the capital supply, but will tend to
increase or decrease the supply of unskilled labour, depending on whether the latter substitutes
for or complements capital in production. Thus, the tax revenue collected from the tax base of
unskilled labour income can either rise or fall after the increase in the capital tax.
As an illustration, we plot the La¤er curves associated with changes in k in Figure 1.
The B=Y curve (lower-right panel) indicates that the target for the debt-to-GDP ratio can be
obtained by either increasing or decreasing k to 65:3% or 40:7%, respectively. In the remaining
subplots in Figure 1, we normalise the current level of tax revenue and debt to 100, to depict
the predicted changes brought about by changes in the tax rate. The relationship between tax
revenue from assets and the capital tax rate (upper-right panel) shows that the economy is on
the upward slopping part of this La¤er curve. Increasing k increases the tax revenue collected
from capital, while falls in k decrease tax revenue from this source. However, the upper-left
and upper-middle panels in the Figure suggest that decreases in k crowd-in both skilled and
unskilled labour and, accordingly, the tax revenue from these sources increases.
The UK economy appears to be near the peak of the total tax revenue and debt La¤er curves
with respect to k. The results for the tax revenue La¤er curve are very similar to those reported
in Trabandt and Uhlig (2012) for the UK. In particular, both models predict for this economy
that the gain in tax revenue by increasing the capital tax to the point where the tax revenue is
maximised is only a few percentage points.22
[Figure 1 about here]
The results for the La¤er curves associated with the remaining tax instruments are, in general,
similar and indicate that, also consistent with Trabandt and Uhlig (2012), the UK is closer to
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the peak of the capital tax La¤er curve, compared to the labour taxes La¤er curves.23 They
also imply that, similar to the analysis in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997), for a given level of
debt, when a tax rate is the variable chosen to satisfy the government budget constraint, there
can be two long-run solutions.24 In Table 3 we summarise the tax changes required to obtain
steady-state equilibria that cohere with the target B=Y ratio of 60%. Given the La¤er curves in
tax revenue and debt discussed above, this target is consistent with both increases and decreases
in tax rates. Table 3 suggests that reductions in each of the taxes individually or jointly are
generally smaller than the respective increases.
[Table 3 about here]
III.2 Evaluation of tax reforms in the long-run
We next calculate the welfare for each agent at the steady-state of the equilibria in Table 3 and
present, in Table 4, the welfare gains/losses relative to the pre-reform economy. To calculate
these welfare changes, we follow Lucas (1990) and compute the percentage extra consumption
that an individual would require so as to be equally well o¤ between the two regimes. This is
dened as:
i =
 
Uposti;ss
Uprei;ss
! 1
(1 ) 1
(20)
for each agent i = c; s; u, where ss denotes welfare calculated in the steady-state.
The rst observation regarding the results in Table 4 is that, as expected, welfare is always
reduced for all agents for increases in tax rates. Therefore, we do not consider these equilibria
further in the analysis which follows.
[Table 4 about here]
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Regarding the fall in tax rates, the results in Table 4 show that there are di¤erent welfare
e¤ects on the agents. In general, tax cuts imply gains (or, at least, no losses) for all types of
agents, with the exception of reductions in u or u, h combined and thus are not Pareto
improving. The biggest welfare gains at the aggregate level are obtained for a capital tax cut.
However, this is also the tax reform with the largest distributional e¤ects, ranging from sizeable
welfare gains for the agents that own capital and supply skilled labour, to near-zero welfare
gains for unskilled workers. This trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and equity is central to the analysis
of capital tax reforms and is well-documented in the related literature (see e.g. Domeij and
Heathcote, 2004; and Garcia-Milà et al., 2010). However, here it is obtained for a capital tax
cut that is not followed by a labour tax increase.
The key to interpreting these results lies in the interaction of the asset and skill inequalities
with the structure of production. As discussed above when analysing Figure 1, a fall in k
increases the capital stock and this raises the productivity of both types of labour, so that
labour supply and labour income are increased. Therefore, workers also gain from a reduction
in the capital tax. This positive productivity spillover e¤ect is an important driver of the zero
long-run optimal capital tax results in models that assume a relatively high complementarity
between the labour input of the worker and capital stock (e.g., as in models using Cobb-Douglas
production functions).
However, consistent with Krusell et al. (2000), a higher capital stock benets skilled more
than unskilled labour, so that the wage premium increases to 32:9% (implying a wage ratio of
1:39) after the reform. Hence, in this model, capital-skill complementarities work to amplify the
inequality implications of capital tax cuts. In contrast, reductions in u or u and h result in
increases in unskilled labour, which in turn increase skilled labour but crowd out capital, thus
leading to lower capital income.25
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III.3 Tax cuts and the skill premium
The general message from the above analysis is that the complementarity and/or substitutability
between factor inputs is important when assessing the e¤ects of tax reforms. This nding is
consistent with related research which has emphasised the importance of di¤erent patterns of
production and sector- and factor-specic technical changes on inequality (see e.g. Hornstein et
al., 2005, for a review). Here, the tax reform plays a similar role to factor-specic technological
progress given the way it a¤ects factor returns and productivity (see also e.g. He and Liu,
2008). By reducing k or h the government is e¤ectively introducing a skill-biased change,
while reductions in u favour the unskilled.
He and Liu (2008) also evaluate the e¤ect of capital tax cuts on the skill premium for a model
that is calibrated to US data and conclude that the capital tax cuts will lead to modest increases
in the skill premium. In particular, the elimination of the capital tax and its substitution with
labour taxes, results in an increase of the skill premium of about 3:3% in their model.
In our model for the UK, the e¤ects of the capital tax cut on this premium are bigger, since the
skill premium rises by 1:8% for a small reduction in the capital tax, by 7:9%. Our model di¤ers
in two important ways.26 First, we allow for agents that di¤er in both capital ownership and skill
supply, whereas He and Liu (2008) use a representative agent model. The higher concentration of
capital that we assume, consistent with the British data, tends to increase the impact of a capital
tax cut on the skill premium. In particular, given that the marginal propensity to save increases
with income, the increase in the supply of capital after the capital tax cut is expected to be
higher in a society characterised by higher concentration of wealth. Second, He and Liu (2008)
allow for endogenous skill formation, so that, in their model a capital tax cut also leads to a
larger rise in the relative skill supply, which acts to moderate the skill premium. In light of these
ndings, our long-run quantitative results can be interpreted as an upper bound on changes in
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inequality. Nevertheless, for shorter horizons, the composition of skill in the population is more
likely to remain unchanged.
III.4 Skill premium and inequality during the transition
We next evaluate the aggregate and distributional e¤ects of the above tax reforms for all periods
after the reform. In particular, we assume that the economy in the current period is at its
pre-reform steady-state, as summarised by Table 2, when we implement the required permanent
tax reforms. These consist of permanent, unanticipated, debt-impacting reductions in the tax
rates, which are changed in the current period in each experiment to their new steady-state
values in Table 3, keeping in each case the remaining tax-spending policy instruments xed. By
expressing the pre-reform steady-state in percent deviations from the post-reform steady-state,
we then simulate the response of the economy post-reform and calculate welfare including all
periods after the reform. Thus, in contrast to the steady-state results reported in Table 4, the
transition path is now taken into account. Table 5 shows the welfare gains/losses for each agent
and tax reform considered.27
[Table 5 about here]
We rst compare welfare gains/costs in Table 5 to the corresponding steady-state values in
Table 4. Consistent with the literature, the results indicate that the larger benets in terms of
aggregate welfare are obtained by capital tax cuts and that these are smaller, compared to the
long-run.28 Moreover, the results show that the inequality e¤ects after the capital tax cuts are
also smaller relative to the steady-state. In particular, capital tax cuts result in smaller welfare
gains relative to the long-run for capitalists and skilled workers, while the welfare gures are
roughly the same for the unskilled workers. In other words, the inequality e¤ects are dampened
by the inclusion of the transition period.
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To further investigate this result we focus again on the capital tax reduction. To this end,
in Figure 2 we plot the transition paths of capital, labour input and consumption by agent, the
relative supply of skilled labour, dened as N
chc+N
shs
Nuhu
, and the skill premium. The paths of
consumption and hours are important as these will ultimately determine welfare for each agent.
The pre-reform steady-state and the transition paths are expressed in percent deviations from
the post-reform steady-state.29
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 shows that a tax reform based on reducing the capital tax implies an increase in
the capital stock as the economy gradually converges to the new equilibrium. The capital tax
cut has created incentives for those agents who hold capital, i.e. capitalists and skilled workers,
to increase their capital accumulation and thus increase investment. For this to be achieved,
capitalists and skilled workers can temporarily decrease consumption, but they also can increase
their income by increasing their labour supply. Therefore, in general equilibrium, the increase
in the return to capital also increases labour supply for those agents who hold capital. For the
capitalists, in particular, the labour supply initially increases above the new steady-state and
then converges to it. As they become wealthier over time, given the higher capital stock, they
tend to supply less labour as the income e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect.
The overshooting in the relative supply of skilled labour in the short-run, driven by the higher
returns to capital that will materialise in the long-run, leads to a fall in the skill premium in the
short-run, which, in turn, has positive e¤ects for the unskilled workers. However, over time, the
relative supply of skilled labour falls and the quantity of capital increases. Both factors lead to a
rising skill premium towards the new steady-state. Overall, the dynamic analysis indicates that,
in general equilibrium, the complementarity between capital (or skilled labour) and unskilled
labour is higher in the short-run, compared with the long-run.
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Therefore, our analysis implies that after the capital tax reform, wage inequality changes
initially favour the agents with less wealth, and this works to partially o¤set the increase in asset
income inequality in the short-run.30 Therefore, in this model of capital-skill complementarity,
the biggest relative gains for the poorest segment of the population after the capital tax cut
materialise immediately after the reform, when the increase in the capital stock is lower and the
relative skill supply overshoots, such that the wage premium moves favourably for the unskilled
workers. Over time, the gains for the unskilled worker are diminishing faster than those for the
skilled and wealthier groups, since both wage and asset income inequality now move in the same
direction, implying that the welfare gap between the agents rises more in the long-run.
III.5 Substitutability between capital and unskilled labour
The above results suggest that the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labour
is a critical factor in determining the inequality e¤ects of capital tax cuts. Thus, we next explore
the quantitative e¤ects of higher elasticities of substitution. As discussed previously, empirical
analyses provide a range of estimates for the critical parameter  in the production function.
We consider a set of values of  which are consistent with this range and re-parameterise the
model to obtain the same factor shares and B=Y ratio as in the pre-reform economy in Table
2.31 In Table 6, we present the results for the welfare gains or losses for the three types of agents
post-reform for the steady-state and for all periods according to these alternative calibrations.
In each case, di¤erent capital tax reductions were applied to reach a debt-to-output ratio of 60%
in the new steady-state.
[Table 6 about here]
The results in Table 6 suggest that over both time horizons considered, the welfare gains
from the reduction in the capital tax to capitalists and skilled workers increase when the sub-
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stitutability between capital (or skilled labour) and unskilled labour is increased. In contrast,
the welfare gains to the unskilled workers fall. Therefore, the overall welfare inequality e¤ects
of capital tax cuts rise in the presence of higher capital skill complementarity, since reductions
in the capital tax are skill-biased and thus raise wage inequality. While these qualitative results
are expected, the small quantitative changes obtained for the empirically relevant range of pa-
rameters considered, lend support to the robustness of the model predictions in Tables 4 and
5.
IV Conclusions
Using a heterogeneous agent model allowing for di¤erent degrees of complementarity between
capital, skilled and unskilled labour, we have evaluated supply-side reforms consistent with a
lower public debt-to-GDP ratio. To implement these reforms, we calibrated the model so that
the pre-reform steady-state represented the current state of the UK economy and then simulated
di¤erent permanent changes in tax rates.
Our results suggest that, relative to the other tax reforms, capital tax reductions lead to
the highest aggregate welfare but are skill-biased and thus increase inequality in the long-run.
Our ndings also show that including the transition period in the welfare evaluation lowers the
inequality e¤ects of reducing the capital tax since the complementarity between capital and all
labour inputs is higher in the short- than in the long-run.
Our results further imply that it may be appropriate to consider redistributive policies along-
side capital tax cuts. While these policies have not been studied here, we expect them to be
more e¤ective if they aim to raise the productivity of factor inputs and, in particular, enhance
social mobility, rather than simply redistribute income towards the income groups that are not
favoured by the reform. A careful evaluation of such policies would be an obvious extension to
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this work. We leave these issues for future research.
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Notes
1At the same time, at the aggregate level, there is also an important literature that examines optimal tax
policy. A benchmark result from Ramsey optimal taxation is that the tax rate on capital should be zero in the
long-run (see e.g. Chamley, 1986, Chari et al., 1994; and Chari and Kehoe, 1999). This result, however, does not
necessarily hold in models incorporating market failures (see e.g. Guo and Lansing, 1999) nor in models under
time-consistent optimal taxation (see e.g. Klein et al., 2008).
2Studies that take into account the redistributive e¤ects of capital taxation in designing optimal taxation
in heterogeneous agent models are fewer. In Judd (1985), Ramsey-type optimal taxation leads to a zero tax
on capital in the long-run. However, this result does not necessarily hold when further types of heterogeneity
and market and policy failures are considered (see e.g. Lansing, 1999, Krusell, 2002, Conesa et al., 2009; and
Angelopoulos et al., 2011).
3See for example, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data for wealth inequality in the USA analysed
in Garcia-Mila et al. (2010), and the Family Resources Survey data discussed in more detail below for the UK.
4See e.g. Hornstein et al. ( 2005), for a review of the literature and empirical evidence on factor- and sector-
specic technologies and inequality.
5The survey is sponsored by the Department for Work and Pensions (see their Table 4.9 for the information
reported here).
6See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D7665.xls.
7See www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D7308.xls.
8See e.g. Martinez-Mongay (2000), for e¤ective tax rates in European countries. More details on tax and other
data used for the calibration are provided later in Section 3.
9Note that we discuss how our results may be a¤ected by this assumption in Section 4.
10Note that, in equilibrium, prots, ft , are driven to zero due to perfect competition.
11See e.g. Aghion et al. (1999), for a microeconomic rationalisation of credit constraints that do not allow
agents to participate in asset markets.
12Table 1 indicates that the numeric parameters are obtained by: (i) assumption (i.e. they are either adopted
from estimation studies or generally accepted values from the literature); (ii) calibration (i.e. they are set in order
to match some equilibrium targets in the data); and (iii) referring directly to the data.
13As discussed in Krusell et al. (2000) and Hornstein et al. (2005), these estimates cohere well with the
microeconometric evidence reported in the literature.
14This is found by calculating the average income tax rate that applies approximately to the lower 30% and
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the upper 70% of the tax payers. We then add the national insurance contribution rate of 11% and calculate the
ratio of these two e¤ective average tax rates.
15To obtain this we divide total hours worked by total hours available for work or leisure, following Ho and
Jorgenson (2001). They assume that there are 14 hours available for work or leisure per day with the remaining
10 hours accounted for by physiological needs.
16See http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk.
17This is calculated as (N
cCc)=Y
C=Y
= (Nc  Cc)=C. The same formula is used below for similar quantities.
18The ratio is calculated as hu
[(Nc=(Nc+Ns))hc+(Ns=(Nc+Ns))hs] . The data refer to average actual weekly hours
of work by industry sector from 1997-2012. Unskilled and skilled hours are obtained respectively by averaging
over industries A-I and J-Q reported in the UK LFS.
19The long-run utility of agent i is given by Ui =

1
1 

ui, for i = c; s; u, where ui is the welfare of agent i
calculated at the steady-state. Also note that Ua = ncUc + nsUs + nuUu:
20Given that we seek to evaluate the distributional e¤ects of tax reforms and not the optimal size of the
government or government debt, we take this debt target as given. Hence, we do not evaluate the potential
welfare benets from reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio, in the form of, for instance, lowering the cost of borrowing
for the government and reassuring nancial markets that there is no risk of default.
21Notice that, conditional on the model being at steady-state after T periods, innite discounted sums involved
in the welfare calculations can be computed exactly (see also e.g. Garcia-Milà et al., 2010). In our case the model
fully converges to the post-reform steady-state for all variables after 140 periods.
22This is despite the use of di¤erent models. Trabandt and Uhlig (2012) use a representative agent model, with
a Cobb-Douglas production function and allow for monopolistic competition in the product market.
23These are not presented to save space but will be made available on request.
24A critical condition for this is that a La¤er curve exists with respect to total tax revenue. Further note
that Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (1997) also discuss the parameter range under which some of these equilibria can
be indeterminate. For our model and the calibrated parameters for the UK, all solutions obtained below are
saddle-path stable.
25Note that by reducing interest payments in the steady-state, the tax cuts considered here imply an additional
channel through which they a¤ect the agents di¤erently. Namely, debt in the steady-state represents assets to
skilled workers and capitalists. Hence, its reduction implies, ceteris paribus, a reduction in an income source for
these two agents, but not for unskilled workers. This hurts capitalists and skilled workers, especially when the
tax rate on unskilled labour falls.
30
26Note also that the policy experiments are di¤erent, since He and Liu (2008) consider a capital tax cut that is
met by a labour tax rise, whereas we isolate the e¤ects of the capital tax cut, by allowing the level of debt and
interest payments on debt to adjust.
27As a robustness check, we also calculated the transition paths and welfare after a tax reform under adaptive
learning as in e.g. Giannitsarou (2006). Given that the tax reforms under analysis imply relatively small changes
in the tax rates, the results in all these are similar with those obtained under the rational expectations solution
reported here. This implies that these tax reforms are e¤ectively learnable.
28Note that the literature on tax reforms (see e.g. Domeij and Heathcote, 2004, and Garcia-Milà et al., 2010),
has emphasised that capital tax cuts will lead to welfare losses for those households whose resources depend
predominantly on labour income, when the elimination of the capital tax cut is met by a rise in the labour tax to
balance the budget. We conrm that this is obtained in this model as well, for a similar tax reform. Results are
available upon request but are not shown here, since, to save on space, we focus on the productivity gains after
a capital tax cut.
29To save space we do not present the Figures associated with the remaining tax reforms reported in Table 5
but these are available on request.
30 In the tax reforms considered in models that do not allow for capital-skill complementarity (e.g. Domeij
and Heathcote, 2004, Greulich and Marcet, 2008; and Garcia-Milà et al., 2010), the productivity gains and thus
the benets to the workers from a capital tax cut are stronger in the long-run, as the capital stock is built up.
However, these models do not allow for an evaluation of the wage inequality following a capital tax cut.
31See e.g. Cantore and Levine (2012) on "re-parameterisation" with CES production functions. The re-
calibration considered here ensures that the values at the pre-reform steady-state when  = f0:42; 0:45; 0:50g are
the same as those reported in Table 2 (i.e. when  = 0:401) up to the third decimal place. For this purpose, 
took the values f0:281; 0:290; 0:303) while  took the values f0:645; 0:645; 0:635g, respectively.
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